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Current Developments in Federal
Employment Discrimination Law
JULIE M. SPANBAUER*
INTRODUCTION

The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA),' which was enacted in
1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act)2 created sweeping
changes in federal employment discrimination law, the effects of which are
just beginning to be felt. 3 The ADA both provided new rights and expand* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. LL.M. 1992,
Northwestern University School of Law; J.D. 1986, Valparaiso University School of Law.
This paper was originally presented as a part of the JMLS Noontime CLE Series which is
offered as a public service by the John Marshall Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12134 (Supp. IV 1992). Title I (§§ 12111-12117) of the ADA
specifically prohibits discrimination by private employers who engage in an industry affecting
commerce and who employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more weeks within the current
or preceding calendar year. § 1211 1(5)(A). Pursuant to Title I, the definition of an employer
also includes employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management
committees. § 12111(2). Because the components of the definition of an employer under
Title VII have been expressly incorporated into Title I of the ADA, it appears likely that state
and local employees are protected under Title I. § 12111(7). In addition, Title II of the
ADA forbids employment discrimination by state and local governments. §§ 12131-12134.
However, the United States, a United States corporation, an Indian tribe, and a bona fide
private membership club are expressly excluded from employment discrimination coverage
under the ADA. § 12111(5)(B).
2. The amendments created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 appear in Title VII as
follows: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(l),(m),(n); 2000e-l(b),(c)(l)-(3); 2000e-2(k)-(n); 2000e-4(h)(2)(j); 2000e-5(e)(2),(g)(2)(B); 2000e-16(d) (Supp. IV 1992). The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act was amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. IV 1992). The 1991 Act also
added 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(b),(c) (Supp. IV 1992). The compensatory and punitive damage
provisions created by the 1991 Act appear at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV 1992).
3. One reason for this delayed effect is that although the ADA became effective on
July 26, 1992, for the first two years after its effective date, coverage did not extend to the
very small employer as it now does in conformity with the language of Title VII: any
employer who employs 15 or more employees during 20 weeks of the current or preceding
calendar year may be subject to liability. Pub. L. 10 1-336 § 108; 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A)
(Supp. IV 1992). Another reason for the delayed impact is that the major changes to federal
employment discrimination law which were brought about by the 1991 Act have very
recently been ruled to have a prospective application only. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114
S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (holding that both the punitive and compensatory damages provisions of
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ed existing rights for disabled employees under federal law.4 The 1991 Act
was intended by Congress primarily to reverse several Supreme Court
decisions and to expand the relief available to successful claimants under
existing federal anti-discrimination statutes. 5 The United States Supreme
Court has since had an opportunity to interpret some of this legislation and,
apparently undaunted by recent congressional disapproval, has also taken an
active part in attempting to clarify some employment discrimination issues
which were not affected by either of these statutes.6

The result has been considerable expansion by a liberal
Congress of

some longstanding doctrines in federal employment discrimination law. The
expansion has seemed to erode, however, under recent interpretations by a
conservative Supreme Court whose opinions have collapsed or contracted
other areas of federal employment discrimination law. This trend has
created a decided tension between the Court and Congress and left a vestige
of uncertainty looming on the horizon for those as-of-yet uninterpreted
provisions.7 The purpose of this paper is modest: to provide an overview
and summary of the present, albeit conflicting, state of federal employment
discrimination law with special emphasis on recent decisions within the
Seventh Circuit.
Part I of this paper discusses the newest, most expansive piece of
federal employment discrimination legislation, the ADA, its scope, its
Title VII should not apply retroactively to litigation .which was pending on or before the
effective date of the 1991 Act).
4. Prior to enactment of the ADA, the most comprehensive federal remedy for
disabled individuals was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which protects the disabled from
discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-795 (1988). The Rehabilitation Act also requires that federal contractors make
affirmative efforts to employ and promote the disabled. § 791(b). Thus, the Rehabilitation
Act covers substantially fewer numbers of employers than does the ADA.
5. Pursuant to sections 2 (Findings) and 3 (Purposes) of Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 556, Congress articulated a need to respond to recent Supreme
Court decisions, referring specifically to the case, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), as a decision which weakened federal civil rights protections. The
amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992) were designed to reverse in part another
Supreme Court decision, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
6. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (1993).
7. Given the very recent changes in the political affiliation of a majority of the
members of Congress and the somewhat recent changes in the composition of the Supreme
Court, it has become even more difficult to predict the future direction of the law in this
volatile area and perhaps even more difficult to know the current direction of the statutory
law along with the current binding effect of some recent Supreme Court decisions. Thus,
practitioners and litigants cannot be certain as to how the past tension which existed between
Congress and the Court will likely be played out.
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relationship to the Rehabilitation Act, and the limited available judicial
interpretation of the ADA within the Seventh Circuit.8 Part II assesses the
current status of Title VII in terms of general burdens and methods of
proof,9 changes in available relief for prevailing plaintiffs under Title
VII,"' the limited retroactive application of the 1991 Act," and the current
scope of sexual harassment hostile environment law.' 2 Part III provides an
overview of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and
describes Congress' movement toward unifying interpretation of ADEA
claims with the interpretation afforded under Title VII. 13 Finally, Part IV
of this paper summarizes the return under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to the analytical
claims of racial discrimination in
format existing under the statute for
4
1989.'
15,
June
to
prior
employment
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
As of July 26, 1994, pursuant to Title I of the ADA,' 5 all employers who employ fifteen or more persons are prohibited from discriminat16

8. See infra notes 15-61 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-127 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 128-141 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. IV 1992). Title I of the ADA requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies parallel to the procedure under Title VII; that is, a
claimant must first file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and in states such as Illinois (deferral states), a claimant must file with the state
agency. § 12117. But see Petersen v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276,
1279-80 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that a claimant pursuing relief under Title II of the
ADA--governmental programs and services--would not be required to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to filing a suit in federal court even when the claimant alleged employment
discrimination as the basis of the claim because the exhaustion language in the EEOC
regulations referred specifically to Title I claims).
16. In Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., 835 F. Supp. 459, 461-62 (N.D. Il1.
1993), the district court interpreted the word "employer" under the ADA in conformity with
the interpretation given under Title VII and held that the owner of a professional corporation
was the corporation's alter ego and thus was subject to liability under the ADA. It should
be noted, however, that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not
expressly addressed the question of individual liability under Title VII, that the federal circuit
courts of appeals are divided on this issue, and that, in fact, the district courts within the
Seventh Circuit are not in agreement. Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit has, however, held
that a supervisor may be personally liable under Title VII. Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d
312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1989).
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The definition

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment. 8
In describing forbidden employment practices, the ADA language is
substantially similar to the language of Title VII and thus can be presumed
to be as far-reaching as Title VII.' 9
Although the ADA is expansive, Congress also made explicit
exceptions to coverage. An employer may prohibit the illegal use of drugs
and alcohol at the workplace. 20 Thus, an "employee or applicant who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" is not considered to be a
"qualified individual with a disability." 2 ' However, an individual
who is
enrolled in or who has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program

17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992).

18. Id. § 12102(2).
19. The ADA expressly declares that: "No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). This language closely parallels Title VII. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (1982).
Under the ADA, it is also unlawful for an employer to engage in the following
practices: to limit, segregate, or classify an individual because of a disability; to use
qualifications, standards, or employment tests or other criteria that screen out disabled
individuals unless the standards or tests are known to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity; to fail to use tests in such a way to ensure that the results reflect abilities
rather than disabilities; to fail to make reasonable accommodations to the known disability
of a qualified individual; to discriminate against a qualified individual because that individual
associates with or has a relationship with a disabled individual; or to take part in a collective
bargaining agreement that has the effect of discriminating against a qualified individual with
a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). For similar language in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
One unique aspect of the ADA prohibitions is their complete ban upon administration of medical examinations or inquiries about disabilities prior to an initial offer of
employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
An employer may only inquire into an
individual's ability "to perform job-related functions." Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1). Nicotine addiction is neither expressly included nor
explicitly excluded as a disability under the ADA. For a general discussion of this issue see
Mark W. Pugsley, Nonsmoking Hiring Policies: Examining the Status of Smokers Under the
Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 43 DuKE L.J. 1089 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
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and is not currently taking illegal drugs may be a qualified individual with
Other specific congressional exceptions to disability
a disability.22
coverage include: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders, other sexual
behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and
psychoactive substance use disorders due to the current use of illegal
drugs.23
As might be expected, litigation issues generally revolve around three
aspects of the statute: whether an individual is "disabled" within the
meaning of the statute; if so, whether a disabled individual is "qualified"
within the meaning of the ADA; and, finally, whether an employer has made
"reasonable accommodations" to the known disability of the otherwise
qualified yet disabled individual.24 First, as to the meaning of the word
"disabled" under the ADA, there are no published opinions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit or from district courts within
the Seventh Circuit which address this particular issue. The regulations
promulgated pursuant to the ADA, however, make clear that a lesser
standard should not be applied to claims pursued under the ADA than to
Act of 1973 and the regulations
claims brought via the Rehabilitation
25
Act.
that
to
pursuant
promulgated
Under the Rehabilitation Act and similar federal statutes, courts and
legislatures have defined disability as including the following:
epilepsy, cardiovascular disease, former drug use, psychiatric problems, legal blindness, manic depressive syndrome, ankylosing spondylitis, which causes stiffening of
the joints, nervous and heart conditions, multiple sclerosis,
blindness in one eye, a heart condition, osteoarthritis of
the knee joints, cerebral palsy and dyslexia, right leg
amputation, and unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke.
The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that
Congress also meant "disability" to include such additional conditions as muscular dystrophy, infection with the
mental retardation, alcoholism, and
AIDS virus (HIV),
26
illness.
emotional
22. Id. § 12114(b).
23. Id. § 12211.
24. Id. § 12111(8), (9).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1994).
26. Lawrence, D. Postol & David D. Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans
With Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 696 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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Additionally, the ADA regulations state that the term disability does not
include physical characteristics, such as height, weight, or muscle tone,
personality traits, including poor judgment or quick temper, and environmental, cultural, or economic deprivations, such as indigence, poor
education, or a record of imprisonment.2 7 Similarly, "temporary, nonchronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long-term or
permanent impact, are usually not disabilities."2 Thus, sprained or broken
joints and limbs do not normally meet the definition of disability. 29 The
regulations also expressly state that "except in rare circumstances, obesity
30
is not considered a disabling impairment.
Second, in order to be qualified, a disabled employee or prospective
employee must be able to "perform the essential functions of the employment position. 01 In assessing whether particular aspects of a job are
essential, a court is permitted to consider the employer's judgment or
opinion as to the essential job functions.32 Additionally, if an employer
has created a written job description before soliciting and interviewing job
candidates, the description is to be considered as evidence of the essential
functions of the job.33
In E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigation, Ltd.,34 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a factual
issue existed as to whether an individual who missed work due to surgery
and treatments for cancer was a qualified, although disabled, individual
within the meaning of the ADA. The defendant, a provider of commercial
security services, did not dispute the fact that the plaintiff's cancer met the
definition of disability under the ADA.35 However, the defendant's main
contention was that the plaintiff, who served as the defendant's chief
executive of the security guard division, was not able to perform the
36
essential functions of his job due to absences from work for medical care.
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app.

28. Id. § 1630.20) app.

29. Id.
30. Id. But see Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps.,
10 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding verdict for obese plaintiff because employer treated
plaintiff as though her condition substantially limited her ability to perform a job which
required no unique physical skills).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. II1. 1993).
35. See id. at 1063-67.
36. Id. at 1063. Another argument made by the defendant was that the plaintiff's
short-term memory loss rendered him incapable of performing the central functions of his

FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

In his capacity as chief executive, the plaintiff supervised approximately 300
employees and hundreds of security guards, dealt with labor unions,
established price rates, and monitored and disciplined employees.37 The
employer argued that during the last twelve months of his employment, the
plaintiff missed work as much as twenty-five percent of the time.3"
The court ruled that although the plaintiff sometimes left work as early
as 2:30 in the afternoon for radiation treatments, as long as he was able to
fulfill his job duties, he would be found qualified. 39 The court so concluded despite evidence which established that the plaintiff's "normal" workday
prior to the advent of his illness began between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. and
ended at approximately 6:00 or 6:30 p.m.40 Finding evidence demonstrating that, after the plaintiff became ill, he continued to work long hours, that
he even worked on Saturdays, and that he also accomplished a great deal of
his work at home,4 1 the court reasoned that:
To be sure, attendance is necessary to any job, but the
degree of such, especially in an upper management
position such as Wessel's [the plaintiff's], where a number
of tasks are effectively delegated to other employees
requires close scrutiny. Further, an executive such as
Wessel more than likely handled a number of his business
matters through customer contact, and this usually is done
by phone or in person at the customer's site. Whether a
phone call is made from the office, a car phone, or a
home is immaterial. Whether a contract is negotiated in
the office or out of the office is immaterial. What is
material is that the job gets done. Therefore, a genuine
issue of fact remains as to whether Wessel was meeting
that threshold of both attendance and regularity necessary

job. Id. at 1064-65. The court ruled that a genuine issue of fact existed which precluded
summary judgment. Id. at 1065. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff could not
perform his work without risking harm to both himself and others based upon the plaintiff's
physician's recommendation that the plaintiff abstain from driving his car because of the
potential for a seizure. Id. at 1066. The court disposed of this argument summarily,
concluding that there was no evidence which indicated that the ability to drive a car was an
essential function of the plaintiffs job. Id.
37. Id. at 1061.
38. Id. at 1063.
39. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1061, 1064 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
40. Id. at 1063.
41. Id. at 1064.
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to perform his job successfully at the time he was discharged.42
The court thus indicated a need to inquire into the individual components of a particular job as determinative of an individual's qualifications
rather than focusing on how that individual performed the job prior to.
becoming disabled.43 In the context of the professional or executive
position, this method of assessing an individual's qualifications greatly
favors the employee who may be unable to perform the job in the same
manner, where, for example, sustained periods of work may become
impossible due to easy fatiguability, or due to appointments during working
hours for treatment or therapy, so long as the employee can accomplish the
required tasks.
Third, as to the employer's duty to accommodate under the ADA, there
are no published opinions within the Seventh Circuit. Congress has
provided some guidance in the form of a nonexclusive list of reasonable
accommodations which an employer must make for an otherwise qualified
disabled employee or prospective employee:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials
or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities."
An employer is not, however, required to make accommodations which
would create an "undue hardship, 45 which Congress has defined as
"requiring significant difficulty or expense, 46 when considered in light of

the following factors:

42. Id.
43. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Iil. 1993).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. IV 1992).
45. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Louis C. Rabaut, The Americans With Disabilities
Act and the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721 (1993);
David Harger, Comment, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct: Reducing the Effects of Ambiguity on
Small Businesses, 41 KAN. L. REV. 783 (1993).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
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(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed
under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or
facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodation; the number of persons employed at such
facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity;
the overall size of the business of a covered entity with
respect to the number of its employees; the number, type,
and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions
of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity.47
Again, because ADA regulations mandate that a lesser standard not be
applied to ADA claims than is applied to Rehabilitation Act claims, 48 a
recent decision of the Seventh Circuit construing the duty to accommodate
under the Rehabilitation Act merits consideration. In Fedro v. Reno, 49 the
court ruled that regulations5" which require as a reasonable accommodation
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1994).
49. 21 F.3d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir. 1994).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 was in effect at the time of the court's decision. It has since
been superseded by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (1993) which provides:
When a nonprobationary employee becomes unable to perform the essential
functions of his or her position even with reasonable accommodation due
to a handicap, an agency shall offer to reassign the individual to a funded
vacant position located in the same commuting area and serviced by the
same appointing authority, and at the same grade or level, the essential
functions of which the individual would be able to perform with reasonable
accommodation if necessary unless the agency can demonstrate that the
reassignment would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
program. In the absence of a position at the same grade or level, an offer
of reassignment to a vacant position at the highest available grade or level
below the employee's current grade or level shall be required, but
availability of such a vacancy shall not affect the employee's entitlement,
if any, to disability retirement pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 8337 or 5 U.S.C. 8451
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that federal employers reassign disabled employees to vacant positions
would not be interpreted to mandate that an otherwise part-time position be
changed into a full-time position or be consolidated with another part-time
position to create a full-time position. Mr. Fedro's mild chronic hepatitis
B precluded him from working in any position in which a likelihood of
violent confrontation existed.5' As such, he could not be restored to his
original position as a Criminal Investigator/Deputy Marshall. 52 He thus
sought priority placement within the Department of Justice." When Mr.
Fedro was offered a part-time position at the level he had requested, he
rejected the offer and argued that a part-time position was not a reasonable
accommodation.54 The Department of Justice declined to place him in a
full-time position because under its then existing policies all such positions
within his general geographic location were being performed by part-time
employees.55 The court agreed with the Department and reasoned that the
accommodation requirement had always been interpreted by courts in
reference to an individual employee's disability. 6 Because Mr. Fedro
wanted the United States Marshall Service "to modify its staffing policies
to create a new position by 'restructuring' two of its existing positions," so
that he could enjoy a greater earning potential than non-disabled employees
enjoyed in that position, the court concluded that such accommodations were
not required.57 Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, under the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations, an accommodation in the nature of a modified
work schedule is only required if that accommodation "makes it possible for
the employee to perform a job that he or she would be otherwise incapable
of doing because of a handicap."5 8
The regulation governing the federal employment reassignment
requirements is much more detailed than is the law governing reassignment
under the ADA. 59 The highly structured job classification system and
salary schedule are the probable reasons for such a detailed federal
regulation. This difference, however, does not preclude application of the
The court stated that this change did not affect its decision. Fedro, 21 F.3d at 1395 n.5.
51. Fedro, 21 F.3d at 1393.
52. Id. at 1392-93.

53. Id. at 1392.
54. Id. at 1393.

55. Id.

56. Fedro, 21 F.3d at 1396.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1992) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(2)(ii) (1994), an employer's accommodation requirements include "job restructuring, part-

time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position ......
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court's reasoning in Fedro to claims brought under the ADA. In fact, the
language of the ADA regarding reassignment appears consistent with the
Fedro court's reasoning. The ADA does not define job-restructuring to
include the consolidation of two part-time positions or the creation of a fulltime position.'
Consistent with the reasoning of the Fedro court, the
ADA refers specifically only to job-restructuring in the form of part-time
employment. 6' Absent a request for the creation of a full-time position
from a part-time position as a necessary response to a disability, such
accommodations may not be required under the ADA within the Seventh
Circuit, especially when an employer has a highly structured job classification and salary system (e.g., a collective bargaining agreement). To create
a full-time position from two part-time positions under these circumstances
would not accommodate the disabled employee, but instead would elevate
the disabled employee over all non-disabled employees.
II. TITLE VII
The most drastic changes via statutory amendment and judicial
interpretation have been to Title VII. This certainly is understandable since
Title VII is the single most comprehensive legislative vehicle for redress of
discrimination in employment. These changes include a restructuring of
both the method and the burden of proof for certain types of claims,
additional monetary relief to a prevailing litigant, and the right to a jury trial
for some types of claims.
A. BURDEN AND METHOD OF PROOF

The 1991 Act reversed in part a 1989 United States Supreme Court
decision, Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,62 and restored the
burden shifting approach for disparate impact cases which had been initially
adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 63 Pursuant
to the 1991 Act, a claim that an employment practice, although neutral on
its face, has a discriminatory effect on a protected class must proceed as
follows: (1) the plaintiff must identify the specific component(s) 64 of an

60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
61. Id.

62. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
63. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
64. Under the 1991 Act, a plaintiff is excused from identifying each particular
employment practice if the plaintiff "can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis .
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
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employment practice which cause a disparate impact and demonstrate 65 by
statistical comparisons that the practice or practices have a disparate impact;
(2) if the plaintiff meets the first step, a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination has been established and the defendant must also demonstrate
that the employment practices or criteria are job related; and (3) if the
defendant meets the second step, the plaintiff retains the opportunity to
demonstrate that less discriminatory alternatives are available to the
defendant which are equally predictive of successful job performance."
Although Congress did not alter the method or burden of proof for
claims of intentional employment discrimination under Title VII, in a
decision rendered after the effective date of the 1991 Act, the Supreme
Court may have effectively altered the burden of proof.67 Since direct
evidence of discrimination is rarely available, most individual disparate
treatment claims under Title VII are made using the inferential method and
more than twenty years ago in McDonnell Douglas
burdens established
68
Corp. v. Green.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must
initially prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class; that the plaintiff was qualified for the position
in question; that the plaintiff was terminated, demoted, or not hired; and that
the position remained available and was later filled by a qualified applicant.69 If the plaintiff establishes these factors, the plaintiff has succeeded
in demonstrating or proving a prima facie case of discrimination.70
The burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, however, and the
defendant must then satisfy only a burden of production by offering a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 7 If the defendant
proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the plaintiff may still
succeed if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the proffered explanation is a

65. Under the 1991 Act, the word "demonstrates" is defined as meeting "the burdens
of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m).
66. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)-(C). It should be noted that in the 1991 Act, Congress
explicitly declared that the only legislative history to be utilized in the interpretation of the
Wards Cove disparate impact line of cases is the interpretive memorandum found at 137
CONG. REC. § 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). For a discussion of the business necessity
defense under disparate impact analysis, see Philip S. Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: A Continuation of the Wards Cove Business Necessity?, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1177 (1994).
67. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
68. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
69. Id. at 802.

70. Id.

71. Id. at 802-03.
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pretext for discrimination, that is, that it is not the reason that motivated the
defendant's decision or that the proffered reason is not worthy of credence.72
The majority in Hicks did not disturb the order of proof or the
allocation of the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case. The Court,
however, interpreted the defendant's burden of production as requiring no
credibility assessment." Thus, the Court concluded that the rejection of
the defendant's proffered reasons does not compel judgment as a matter of
law for the plaintiff.74 instead, the Court stated that all that is required is
that the defendant "'clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence,' reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of
the employment action. 7 5 The Court explained that the burden of
production involves no credibility assessment of the defendant's proffered
explanation for the adverse employment action. 76 The Court thus concluded that the presumption disappears and cannot be later resurrected to compel
judgment for the plaintiff.77 The fact finder must then determine whether
the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the defendant's actions were
7
discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. 1
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter, who was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that this reasoning is a departure
from the McDonnell Douglas framework because it allows the fact finder to
rely for its decision on reasons not clearly articulated by the defendant or
not articulated at all by the defendant.7 9 The dissent argued that the very
purpose of the defendant's burden of production is to narrow the issues so
that the plaintiff has a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination.8s The dissent found
that the majority's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas framework made
the whole burden-shifting construct meaningless if it did not bind the
employer to its proffered explanation. 8 ' The dissent thus concluded that
72. Id. at 804.
73. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993).
74. Id. at 2749.
75. id. at 2747 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981)).
76. Id. at 2748.
77. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2761.
81. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2759 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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if the employer's burden of production is not interpreted to make the inquiry
more specific, the plaintiffs burden of proof is enhanced, and this
interpretation of the inferential method of proof "greatly disfavors Title VII
plaintiffs without the good luck to have direct evidence of discriminatory
'' 2
intent. 1
Although the Hicks case represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has ever interpreted the defendant's burden of production in such a
manner, the Hicks decision will not dramatically affect decisions within the
Seventh Circuit.8 3 As early as 1991, in Visser v. Packer Engineering
Ass'n, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clearly
held that if the employer's proffered explanation is found to be a pretext "-a
phony reason- for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact is
permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real reason [is]"
discriminatory. The entire effect of the Hicks decision upon the courts
within the Seventh Circuit, however, remains to be seen.85

82. Id.
83. Indeed, decisions rendered after the Hicks opinion have not altered the Court's
analysis. See, e.g., Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir.
1994); McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1993); Rennie v.
Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1108 n.7 (7th Cir. 1993).
84. 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991).
85. The most interesting application of the Hicks rationale may well be at the summary
judgment stage of the proceedings. Without a credibility assessment or a narrowing of the
issues at the summary judgment phase, judgment may be entered more frequently against
plaintiffs. Because the Seventh Circuit has applied the Hicks rationale prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in that case, the impact may be greater in other circuits. Moore v:
Nutrasweet Co., 836 F. Supp. 1387, 1395-1402 (N.D. I11.
1993) (holding that raising only a
possible doubt as to defendant's proffered explanation is insufficient as a matter of law to
ensure the plaintiff will escape summary judgment and proceed to trial). In Moore, the
district court relied on the reasoning provided by the Seventh Circuit in an earlier opinion:
[I]t does not follow from all this, as [plaintiff] appears to believe, that if the
plaintiff does rebut the employer's rebuttal--not in the sense of demolishing it but
in the sense of contesting it with his own, contrary evidence--he automatically
defeats summary judgment and secures his right to a trial. The district court must
still make a judgment as to whether the evidence, interpreted favorably to the
plaintiff, could persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated
against the plaintiff. If not, the court must grant the employer's motion for
summary judgment.
Id. at 1396 (quoting Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1570 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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B. RELIEFM

In addition to traditional equitable remedies in the form of back pay
and interest on back pay, a Title VII claimant who alleges intentional
discrimination is now entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages,
and because the relief is no longer solely equitable, a claimant also has the
right to a jury trial. 7 Limits have been created for both compensatory and
punitive damages based on the size of an employer's workforce."s In order
to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer

86. The compensatory and punitive damages and the caps which were made available
under the 1991 Act, were also made available for ADA claimants alleging intentional
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
87. Id. § 1981a(b)(2)-(3),(c). In a mixed motive case of intentional discrimination,
damages are not available when a defendant "demonstrates that the respondent [defendant]
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor..
. ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1992). In such cases, in addition to not
awarding damages the court "shall not . . . issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion ....
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). Instead, the plaintiff is
limited to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees and costs which are "directly
attributable only to the pursuit of' the disparate treatment, mixed motive claim. Id. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B)(i).
88. The sum of the amount awarded for compensatory damages ("future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other nonpecuniary losses") and for punitive damages cannot exceed the following
limitations:
(A) in the case of respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees
in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$50,000; and
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
It is true that the addition of a damage remedy under Title VII is a dramatic shift
from the traditional equitable remedies which served as the only available relief under the
statute for more than 25 years. The upper limitations on damage awards, however, provide
some balance, especially for the small employer who could be bankrupt after a single
successful lawsuit in which punitive damages are awarded, while recognizing that
discrimination causes tangible harm to the victim. As such, the addition of the potential
monetary relief should create an incentive for employers to pay greater attention to
discrimination in the workplace.
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acted "with malice or with reckless indifference to the [plaintiff's] federally
protected rights."89 Certain limitations apply to these monetary remedies.
For instance, a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages from a governmental employer. 90 Additionally, the damages awarded to a prevailing
plaintiff cannot be duplicative of relief pursued and received under §
1981.91 Due to the limited scope of § 1981, this restriction applies only
to claims of race discrimination. 92
A prevailing disparate impact litigant is limited to traditional Title VII
equitable remedies and consequently has no right to a jury trial. 9a In
addition to the longstanding entitlement to attorneys fees 94 (except in a
case in which the EEOC or the United States is the prevailing party), all
successful Title VII litigants, whether plaintiff or defendant, whether claims
are based on impact or intentional discrimination, are entitled to expert
witness fees within the discretion of the trial court. 95
C. RETROACTIVITY
Although the 1991 Act is not retroactive as to disparate impact
claims; 96 or as to court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements which were in effect and which were made in accordance with
existing law; 97 or as to the Title VII provisions extending overseas; 98 or
as to the Technical Assistance Institute, 99 the language of the 1991 Act
provides no specific guidance for other types of claims. The general
effective date provision of the 1991 Act simply states that "[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this
Act shall take effect upon enactment.'0 This ambiguous language

89. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).

90. Id.

91. Id. § 1981a(a)(1).

92. Id. § 1981(a).
93. Id. § 1981a(a)(1).

94. A "prevailing party" is entitled to "a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k) (Supp. IV 1992).
95. Id. This amendment reversed the Supreme Court's opinion in West Virginia Univ.
Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1146-48 (1991) (holding that language of attorney fee
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is 'plain and unambiguous" providing no authority to shift expert
witness fees as part of attorney fee award). The question that remains is whether an award
of expert witness fees will include non-testimonial as well as testimonial experts.
96. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Section 402(b), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).

97. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Section 116, 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).
98. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Section 109(c), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).
99. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Section I10(b), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).

100. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Section 402(a), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).

For a general
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provided problems for litigants whose claims were filed before the effective
date of the 1991 Act but were still pending at that time. Many disparate
treatment litigants wished to amend their claims to request compensatory
and punitive damages.
These litigants' problems were compounded by two seemingly
contradictory lines of Supreme Court authority on the retroactive effect of
civil statutes. One line of Supreme Court doctrine makes clear that a court
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.'0 ' In
another line of cases, the Court declared that the retroactive application of
a civil statute is not favored.'O°
On April 26, 1994, the Supreme Court ruled that the damage provisions
under the 1991 Act are not to be applied retroactively to claims pending on
or before November 21, 1991, the effective date.'0 3 Initially, the Court
clarified that there was no conflicting Supreme Court precedent, that there
is a presumption against retroactivity unless the statute unambiguously
requires such application.' °4 Upon examining the 1991 Act, the Court
found that it did not clearly call for retroactive application of its terms. 0 5
The Court reasoned that the newly enacted punitive damages provision
shares "key characteristics of criminal sanctions" and therefore would raise
a serious question under the Ex Post Facto Clause if retroactively imposed.' 06 The Court also found that because the compensatory damage
provision created a new right to damages and substantially increased an
employer's potential liability under Title VII, it too should apply prospectively.' 7
discussion of the retroactivity issue under the 1991 Act, see Michele A. Estrin, Note,
Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2035 (1992); Daniel Patrick Tokaji, Note, The Persistence of Prejudice: Process Based
Theory and the Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 103 YALE L.J. 567 (1993).
101. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 717 (1974) (ruling that statute
authorizing attorney's fee award to successful civil rights litigants would be applied
retroactively to cases pending on appeal at time of statute's enactment).
102. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (ruling that
Department of Health and Human Services was without authority to promulgate rule
mandating refund of payments for services provided before effective date of rule).
103. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
104. Id. at 1500-01.
105. Id. at 1493.
106. Id. at 1505.
107. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1506 (1994). In a decision issued
before Landgraf the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the
portion of the 1991 Act which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should not apply retroactively.
Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1992). The court prohibited
litigants whose cases were filed prior to the effective date of the 1991 Act from relying on
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D. SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The 1991 Act did not directly affect claims of sexual harassment (with
the exception of creating additional relief for successful disparate treatment
claimants). Sexual harassment violates Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's . . .
sex. '' °8 Courts recognize two forms of sexual harassment: hostile work
environment sexual harassment and quid pro quo sexual harassment.10 9
Hostile environment claims are created when an employer's conduct
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment." "0 To prevail in a claim of sexual harassment, the plaintiff
must show only that the conduct in question was unwelcome and was
sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of
employment."'
In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,112 the Supreme Court was presented
with the opportunity to definitively resolve the issue of employer liability
for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor. The Court declined ruling
on the issue because it found the record deficient as to whether a hostile
environment had been created. The Court did, however, agree with the
EEOC's position that agency principles should govern resolution of the
issue.113
The Court left open whether 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c), a guideline issued
by the EEOC, is entitled to deference. 14 In a concurring opinion in

the amendments. The court reasoned that this particular amendment overruled a decision of
the United States Supreme Court which meant that the amendment created a new rule of law.
Id. This reasoning seems to conform to the conservative reading afforded the 1991 Act by
the Court in Landgraf.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). See also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66-67 (1986).
109. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65-66. For a discussion of the similarities and distinctions of
these two legal theories and general litigation strategies for sexual harassment claims, see
Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037 (1993).

110. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
111. Id. In contrast, quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer alters
the conditions of employment for an employee when that employee refuses to submit to
sexual demands. Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. 477 U.S. at 72-73.
113. Id. at 72.

114. Id. at 71.
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Vinson, Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens, argued that this guideline is entitled to great deference:"Applying general Title VII principles, an employer ... is
responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were
authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence. The Commission [EEOC] will
examine the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the job functions performed by the
individual in determining whether an individual
acts in
16
either a supervisory or agency capacity.'
Justice Marshall stated that in promulgating this guideline, the EEOC
conformed to "the general standard of employer strict liability with respect
to agents and supervisory employees .
*...""'
Justice Marshall also
pointed out that Title VII penalties are often imposed against the employer
for the acts of individual employees (reinstatement, back pay, etc.)."'
In Horn v. Duke Homes, 119 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Vinson, the Seventh Circuit had independently decided to adopt the EEOC's
guidelines on strict liability for sexual harassment committed by a supervisory employee. In Horn, however, the claim involved quid pro quo harassment and not a hostile environment claim. 2 ' It thus remains an open
question in the Seventh Circuit whether strict liability will be imposed for
a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, but it appears that
agency principles will be applied to the particular employment situation to

115. Id. at 74.
116. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 74; 29 C.F.R. § 160 4 .11(c) (1993).
117. Id. at 74-75 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (1980)).
118. Id. at 75.
119. 755 F.2d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1985).
120. Id. at 603. But see North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 844 F.2d
401, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1988). Although the North decision did not involve sexual harassment,
the Seventh Circuit ruled, in reliance on the Vinson decision, that strict liability of an
employer is not mandated for the discriminatory acts of a supervisory employee unless that
employee either "controlled or influenced" the employer's decision. Id. at 408. The Seventh
Circuit clarified that in order for an employer to be held liable for the acts of a supervisory
employee, the supervisor must either have committed the acts of discrimination within the
apparent scope of the authority entrusted to the supervisor by the employer or the employer
must have known or should have known of the supervisor's discriminatory actions and failed
to take appropriate remedial measures. Id. at 407.
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determine liability.' 21 Of course, the stakes would be much higher if strict
liability were imposed in such a setting given the compensatory and punitive
damages provisions which are now available under Title VII for claims of
disparate treatment.
In its most recent consideration of a sexual harassment claim, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Vinson as to the appropriate test:
"when the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment,' Title VII is violated." 22 The Court clarified that an
employee's psychological well being need not seriously be affected before
liability will attach, that the question "is not whether work has been
impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily
altered."' 2 3 The Court thus cautioned that the individual employee's
psychological well being is relevant but that all circumstances must be taken
into consideration. 24 Thus, the inquiry in a hostile environment claim
proceeds from both a subjective and an objective viewpoint. 125 Finally,
the Court clarified that the objective portion of the inquiry should invoke the
traditional reasonable person test. 26 The Court did not seize the opportunity to adopt the reasonable woman standard utilized by some of the lower
federal courts but, at the same time, did not explicitly rule out such a
27

standard. 1

121. Horn, 755 F.2d at 603.

122. Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (quoting Vinson, 477

U.S. at 65, 67)).
123. Id. at 372.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 371.
126. Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).

127. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling

that the evidence should be viewed in the plaintiff's favor, focusing on what "a woman in
her position would" do). Cf. Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 & n.13
(7th Cir. 1993): "We are not called upon to decide here whether it might be more

appropriate to evaluate the plaintiff s work environment from the perspective of a reasonable

woman as opposed to a genderless reasonable person." The court in this case concluded that

its decision would be the same under either standard. Id.

For an assessment of the

arguments regarding the appropriateness of the reasonable woman standard in sexual
harassment litigation, see Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment
Law: Progressor Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (1993); Jolynn Childers, Is There
a Placefor a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment,42 DUKE L.J. 854 (1993).

FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

III. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
The 1991 Act made some changes to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) which bring it closer to Title VII in terms of
administrative exhaustion requirements and procedural prerequisites to filing
a lawsuit. The 1991 Act specifically eliminated the two and three-year
statutes of limitation for ADEA claims and substituted the Title VII
requirement that suit must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a right
The 1991 Act did not extend the
to sue notice from the EEOC.128
punitive damages remedies under Title VII to ADEA claims, leaving intact
the liquidated damages provision available under the ADEA for wilful
violations. 129
Additionally, the Supreme Court appeared to severely limit an ADEA
claimant's ability to prove disparate treatment discrimination. In Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins,' 30 the Court ruled that the employer does not violate
the ADEA by discharging an employee who is within the protected age
group if the purpose of the discharge is to interfere with an employee's
pension benefits that would have vested due to a particular number of years
of service. The Court found that pension status when it is tied to years of.
service, although "empirically correlated with age," is a factor other than
age.' 3' The Court concluded that in order to be successful in an ADEA
disparate treatment claim, a litigant must prove that he or she was evaluated
not upon performance but upon the basis of age: "It is the very essence of
age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer
believes that productivity declines with age."' 13 2 The Court stated that the
proper remedy for a claim that an employer fired an employee to prevent
pension benefits from vesting is § 510 of ERISA.'3 3
What is troubling about this decision is that the same general principles
are applied to disparate treatment discrimination under the ADEA as are
applied under Title VII.134 Consequently, this unanimous Supreme Court
opinion can be read as an evisceration of the McDonnell Douglas inferential
method of proving intentional discrimination not just pursuant to the ADEA

128. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. IV 1992). For an overview of the ADEA, its history,
and the bona fide occupational qualification defense, see Tracy Karen Finkelstein, Judicial
and Administrative Interpretations of the BFOQ as Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 217 (1992).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
130. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
131. Id. at 1705.
132. Id. at 1706.
133. Id. at 1707.
134. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705-06 (1993).
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but under Title VII.13s The theory underlying the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, however, is that intent to discriminate is sometimes very
difficult to prove. 36 The prima facie case incorporates the two most
common legitimate reasons for an adverse employment decision: the
employee or prospective employee was not qualified for the position or there
were no available positions.37 If the reasoning in Biggins were extended
to claims of sex and race discrimination, many claims of discrimination
which would survive the initial burden imposed by McDonnell Douglas
would not survive the scrutiny applied by the Court in Biggins.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit has made the extension, holding, in
conformity with Biggins, that an employee who was terminated for
excessive tardiness on the day before her maternity leave was scheduled to
begin had failed to show that the termination violated the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.' 38 The court reasoned that "employers can treat
pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
employees."' 139 Relying on Biggins, the court concluded that an employer
is required only to ignore an employee's pregnancy, not an employee's
absences from work, even if those absences are due to pregnancy-related
conditions. 4 ° Because the plaintiff failed to persuade the court that in the
absence of her pregnancy, she would not have been fired, her discrimination
claim failed. 4 ' The entire impact of the Biggins decision is yet to be
played out within this circuit, but it appears that this Supreme Court ruling
may place greater restrictions on plaintiffs than have been imposed in more
than twenty years.
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
part:

Prior to its recent amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981142 read in pertinent
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to

135. The Seventh Circuit has already followed the reasoning in Biggins in a fairly recent
decision construing the ADEA. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125
(7th Cir. 1994) (ruling in conformity with Biggins that an older employee who was fired in
order to reduce salary costs failed to establish intent to discriminate on the basis of age).
136. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n.44 (1977).
137. Id.
138. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. This section is now 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
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make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
and exacpunishments, pains, penalties, taxes, 14 licenses,
3
tions of every kind, and to no other.
The purpose of the amendment was to reverse a recent Supreme Court
decision in which the Court ruled that § 1981 prohibited discrimination only
in the "making" of a contract and could not be invoked for "post-formation"
discrimination such as racial harassment, demotion, or termination.' This
congressional amendment effectively reinstates case law existing within the
Seventh Circuit before 1989, the date of the Supreme Court decision in
Patterson.
The 1991 Act retains the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
adds the following language for purposes of clarification:
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce
contracts" includes the making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.'4 5
Nothing about the amendment restricts this rather substantial body of
pre-Pattersoncase law addressing claims of intentional race discrimination
in the employment setting."' The amendments explicitly state that 47§ 1981
claims may be brought against both private and public employers. 1

143. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).

144. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
146. In 1975, the Supreme Court clarified that § 1981 was not restricted to governmental employers. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (holding
"it is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals--and we now join them--that § 1981
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race").
Until the United States Supreme Court decision in Pattersonin 1989, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had applied § 1981 to private and public employment
discrimination claims based on hiring and post-hiring decisions. North v. Madison Area
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 844 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1988); Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984); Burlington Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978).
147. "The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law." 42 U.S.C. §
1981(c).
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CONCLUSION

The changes to the law of federal employment discrimination have been
substantial over the past several years. What is most interesting is that some
of the changes have produced a liberalization of this area of the law, while
others can be read as greatly restricting the available rights and remedies of
victims of discrimination in the workplace. Some of the new legislation has
not been meaningfully interpreted as of yet, and some of the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court have not been applied by the lower courts
to enough fact scenarios to provide the full flavor or impact of these
decisions upon claims of discrimination. As such, much more interpretation
of this law must be made before any definitive conclusions can be drawn
about the course and direction of federal employment discrimination law.
The assessments regarding the present state of the law and the projections
made in this article about the future direction of the law are, of necessity,
only provisional.

